Showing posts with label Direct Plans. Show all posts

September 02, 2018

Can Distributor Commissions Impact Direct Plan Expense Ratios?

When it comes to distributor commissions, there are two sets of guidelines/ rules in particular, that fund houses are expected to follow.  The first defines the limits of how much can be paid from a mutual fund scheme to any distributor.  The second stipulates that the cost of commissions paid to distributors not be charged to investors in direct plans.  So, on the face of it, it would appear to be legally impossible for expense ratios of direct plans to be impacted by these commissions.  However, despite being sandwiched between these limitations, fund houses have a way around this. 

While most of the commissions to distributors are paid from the respective mutual fund schemes (and are clearly reflected in the expense ratios), in the case of many fund houses, there are also significant amounts paid that these fund houses cannot (or do not want to) show in the accounts of the respective schemes.  These commission payments are then made from the books of the AMCs.  If you take the top 3 AMCs (by AUM), it would appear that in 2017-18, such commission payments accounted for almost 60% of the overall expenses of these AMCs and made up over 28% of the fee that they charged for managing their schemes (a.k.a. management fee). 

The way I see it, one would have to be pretty naïve to believe that these payments to distributors did not influence the management fees charged by the AMC to the mutual fund schemes (including direct plans).  Based on what I saw of the financials of the top 3 fund houses, if these commission payments were not to have been made, as a rough estimate, the expense ratios of the direct plans of their equity funds, on an average, could have been lower by around 0.35%.

But even when one considers commission payments made from the mutual fund schemes, not everything may be above-board.  Here’s an example of something that I saw recently, and which I found questionable.

Over the past month or so, it appears that a number of AMCs, across several schemes, reduced the commissions that they were paying to distributors from these schemes.  In itself, this reduction in distributor commissions should have brought down the expense ratios of the regular plans of the concerned schemes.  But rather than pass the benefit of that reduction to investors,  the AMCs decided to correspondingly increase their management fees.  Obviously then, there was no reduction in expense ratios of the regular plans where this happened.  What’s worse is that this action resulted in an increase in the expense ratios of direct plans. 

To illustrate how this played out, let me put before you the break-up of the expense ratios of a certain hybrid fund, up until a few days ago, before these were changed.

Expense Ratios: Before Changes

Regular Plan Direct Plan
Management Fee 0.67%
Commissions 1.10%
Base TER
1.77% 0.67%
Other Expenses
0.33% 0.05%
GST
0.12% 0.12%
Total TER 2.22% 0.84%

TER: Total Expense Ratio.  Management fee is charged by the AMC while commissions are paid to distributors.  GST is calculated @18% on the management fee.  Information for Base TER, Other Expenses and GST has been taken from AMC disclosures.  Management Fee and Commission have been inferred from the available information.

Then, a few days ago, it appears that the fund house decided to reduce the element of commissions in the base TER from 1.10% to 0.90%.  But, as I said above, rather than give the benefit of this reduction to investors, the AMC chose to increase its management fees.  After the change, this was the break-up of the scheme’s expense ratios:

Expense Ratios: After Changes

Regular PlanDirect Plan
Management Fee0.87%
Commissions0.90%
Base TER
1.77%0.87%
Other Expenses
0.33%0.05%
GST
0.16%0.16%
Total TER2.26%1.08%

TER: Total Expense Ratio.  Management fee is charged by the AMC while commissions are paid to distributors.  GST is calculated @18% on the management fee.  Information for Base TER, Other Expenses and GST has been taken from AMC disclosures.  Management Fee and Commission have been inferred from the available information.

If you compare the two tables, you will notice that as a direct consequence of the  AMC’s decision to pocket the entire reduction in commissions, the expense ratio of the direct plan jumped up. 

As I mentioned earlier, this is not an isolated case.  Over the past month or so, I noticed several schemes across multiple fund houses where, in varying degrees, something similar had happened.

The expense ratio is typically described as an indicator of what a fund house charges.  Call me cynical if you like, but I look at the expense ratio as a means to know if a fund house is fleecing me.  Thanks to SEBI’s disclosure requirements, more than ever before, it has become easy to access and analyze expense ratios, and to understand how some fund houses adjust/ manipulate expense ratios to shaft investors.  It’s in our own interest to take advantage of the availability of this information.

June 12, 2018

Scheme Mergers Can Be Costlier Than You Think

As part of the scheme rationalization exercise directed by SEBI, HDFC MF merged its Balanced Fund with its Premier Multi-Cap Fund w.e.f. close of business hours on 1 June.  To put it more accurately, Premier Multi-Cap Fund, an equity fund, was first transformed into a hybrid fund and was renamed as HDFC Hybrid Equity Fund.  Then, on the same date, Balanced Fund was merged into that fund.  It was a complex manoeuvre that confounded many industry insiders and observers, including me.  

For one, at its heart, this was a merger of a hybrid fund with a pure equity fund.  Mergers between dissimilar funds are fraught with a variety of issues and are hard to justify.  Secondly, if, for some reason, such a merger was warranted, then the most practical and straightforward approach would have been to merge Premier Multi-Cap Fund into Balanced Fund (and not the other way round).  After all, the new scheme was more similar to Balanced Fund than to Premier Multi-Cap Fund.  Also, at the time of the announcement, Premier Multi-Cap Fund had AUM of ~300 crore while Balanced Fund had AUM of ~22,000 crore.  It would have made more sense for the smaller scheme to be merged with the bigger scheme than vice versa. 

Like many others, I decided to write it off as a mystery.  Then, last Friday, an investor in the direct plan of Hybrid Equity Fund reached out to me on this.  He had been an investor in Balanced Fund before the merger, and there was something that bothered him.  From what he could make out, after the merger, the expense ratio of his investments had significantly gone up.  He sought my view on whether this was actually the case.

It turned out that his observation was spot on.  Here are the facts:

  • On 1 June, the date of the merger, the total expense ratio (TER) of Balanced Fund (direct plan) was 0.56% while the TER of Premier Multi-Cap (direct plan) was 2.16%.   Post-merger, the TER of the direct plan of the merged fund (HDFC Hybrid Equity Fund) was 2.16%.
  • On 4 June, the TER of the direct plan of Hybrid Equity Fund was reduced  to 1.43%.  This continued till 7 June. 
  • From 8 June, the TER was reduced to 0.66%.

As would be evident from the above, even after the “reductions”, post-merger, investors in the direct plan of Balanced Fund (who opted for the merger) have been paying more than what they were paying earlier.

There is one other thing worth pointing out over here regarding the reductions.  It would seem that 0.15% of the reduction was on account of a change directed by SEBI to all fund houses.  In other words, if the merger had not happened, it was likely that, thanks to SEBI, the expense ratio of Balanced Fund would have been brought down to 0.41%.  If so, that makes the difference with the post-merger TERs even more glaring.

If my numbers are correct, in the 11 days since the merger, the investors in the direct plan of Balanced Fund (who opted for the merger) have been collectively charged (excluding GST) an additional ~67 lakhs (i.e. over and above what they would have been charged, had the merger not happened).  At present, by my estimate, they are being collectively charged (excluding GST) an additional ~2.3 lakhs per day (unless, of course, the fund house reduces the expense ratio further).

Something similar to this (though not to the same extent) happened to investors in the direct plan of HDFC Prudence Fund .  Like Balanced Fund, this, too, was questionably merged into an equity fund (HDFC Growth Fund) whose attributes were changed to make it a hybrid fund – HDFC Balanced Advantage Fund. 

All of this raises the question: did HDFC AMC act in an unfair manner with the investors in Balanced Fund and Prudence Fund, particularly those in the direct plans? 

Certainly, there are grounds to believe so.  Consider this: pre-merger, the AUM of Balanced Fund (direct plan) was ~3,500 crore while the AUM of Premier Multi-Cap (direct plan) was merely ~18 crore.  If their pre-merger expense ratios were to have been applied proportionate to their AUM, then the post-merger expense ratio should have right away been fixed at 0.57% (instead of 2.16%).

Of course, it can be argued that the merger letter to investors mentioned the then expense ratios of both schemes, so any investor who felt that he/ she was being treated unfairly, could have exited.  On the other hand, it can also be argued there was no mention of the possible increase in expense ratios in the key paragraph on “Consequences of Merger of Schemes” in the merger letter. 

It might be a good idea for SEBI to examine if something can be done to ensure that investors are treated fairly in mergers.

For now, this should serve as a cautionary tale for investors.

June 18, 2015

Are Direct Investments Accelerating?

Consider this data taken from the AMFI website:

 

Total AAUM

Rs. crore

Direct AAUM

Rs. crore

Share of Direct to Total

Mar 2014

8,96,352

3,13,899

35%

Dec 2014

11,28,237

4,06,339

36%

May 2015

12,26,352

4,58,016

37%

While these are average AUM numbers for the respective months, it would still be reasonable to infer that from April 2014 through December 2014, the overall AUM of the industry increased roughly by 2,31,885 crore while the AUM through direct plans increased roughly by 92,440 crore.  In other words, the increase in AUM through direct plans was around 40% of the increase in the overall AUM.

But how much of this increase was on account of fresh sales?  I may be wrong but AMFI doesn’t appear to publicly divulge that number.  However, SEBI has given us this breakup in its just-released Handbook of Statistics on Indian Securities Market 2014.  As per Table 44, the amount of “Net Inflows” during the period from April 2014 through December 2014 was 87,942 crore.  Of this, 42,546 crore i.e. 48%, was through direct plans.

If you consider the period from January 2015 through May 2015, the overall AUM of the industry increased roughly by 98,115 crore while the AUM through direct plans increased roughly by 51,678 crore.  In other words, the increase in AUM through direct plans was around 53% of the increase in the overall AUM.  I’m not sure when SEBI (or AMFI, maybe?) will release the data for net sales for this period but for now, I’ll just leave you with something to think over: is the share of direct investments rapidly increasing?

The Handbook of Statistics on Indian Securities Market 2014 can be accessed here

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